Introduction
In September of 2011 Edward Nelson announced that he had a proof of the inconsistency of Peano Arithmetic. He had devoted twenty-five years to constructing the proof. When Terence Tao and Daniel Tausk independently found an error, Ed withdrew his claim at once and cheerfully returned to work on it the next day. By March of 2013 -confident that he had corrected the error -he wrote a project proposal with "a crucial new insight: technically, bounds in the Hilbert-Ackermann consistency theorem depending only on rank and level, but not on the length of the proof." The project he proposed "challenges the entire current understanding and practice of mathematics....It will radically change the way mathematics is done. This will affect the philosophy of mathematics, how the nature of mathematics is conceived. It will also affect the sciences that use mathematics, especially physics....It addresses a very big question: does mathematics consist in the discovery of truths about some uncreated eternal reality (the traditional Platonic view), or is it a humble human endeavor to construct abstract patterns that will be sound, free of all contradiction, in the hope that some will be beautiful, uplifting the human spirit, and that some (not necessarily different ones) will be of practical use to improve the human lot?"
The following excerpts from Ed's proposal describe his vision of a new mathematics and the open question of the consistency of Peano Arithmetic.
"Peano Arithmetic is one of the simplest and most fundamental of mathematical theories. Its consistency, however, has not been proved by any means that all mathematicians accept. It implies that all primitive recursive functions are total, but they are directly defined only for numerals, and the argument that the values always reduce to numerals is circular. The proposal is to complete a proof that Peano Arithmetic is in fact inconsistent. The principal output will be a book entitled 'Elements'. The outcome will be a major change in the way mathematics is done, with philosophical and scientific consequences.
"The guiding spirit of this investigation is that mathematics is not some uncreated abstract reality that we can take for granted and explore, but that it is a human endeavor in which one should begin by looking at the very simplest concepts without taking them for granted.
"Numbers are constructed from 0 by successively taking successors; S . . . S0 is called a numeral. Definitions of primitive recursive functions, such as addition, multiplication, exponentiation, superexponentiation, and so forth, are schemata for constructing numerals. They define a value for 0 and then a value for Sx in terms of the value for x. But when numerals are substituted for the variables in such a schema it is not clear that it defines a numeral: the putative number of steps
Against finitism
Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (PRA) was invented by Skolem [Sk] in response to Principia Mathematica with the express purpose of avoiding quantification over infinite domains. His tools were primitive recursion and induction.
Familiar examples of primitive recursions are
x + 0 = x x + Sy = S(x + y)
x · 0 = 0 x · Sy = x + (x · y)
A numeral is a term containing only S and 0, and a primitive recursive (PR) number is a variable-free term all of whose function symbols are PR. The finitary credo is that PR numbers reduce to numerals by applying the equations a sufficient number of times. If indeed that were so, the applications used could be counted by a numeral. But in general the number of applications needed can be expressed only in terms of PR numbers themselves-the argument is blatantly circular.
The objection being raised here is not some vague semantic "ultrafinitistic" assertion that some PR numbers are so big they don't really exist. Certainly the PR number SS0 ⇑ SSSSSS0 exists: here it is, in front of our eyes, consisting of eleven symbols. The problem is syntactical. Let A be a formula that holds for 0 and is such that whenever it holds for x it holds for Sx. Then A holds for any numeral n; this follows from the basis A x (0) by modus ponens applied as many times as there are occurrences of S in n. But the postulation of induction, implying that A holds for every PR number, is an expression of the finitary credo.
PRA is a boldly speculative attempt to treat PR numbers as if they were equal to numerals. We shall see that it is inconsistent.
Outline
The next section describes the notational and terminological conventions used in this paper (including the present outline) and formulates PRA as a formal system. Section 4 explicitly defines a binary function symbol Eq such that ⊢ Eq(x, y) = 0 ↔ x = y and §5 introduces bounded quantifiers. Section 6 introduces strings and their combinatorics, and §7 uses them to formulate arithmetization. Section 8 establishes a form of Chaitin's Let x, y, and z be distinct, let a contain no variables other than those in x, and let b contain no variables other than those in x, y, and z. Then f is defined by primitive recursion from a and b by A1. f( x, 0) = a A2. f( x, Sy) = b z f( x, y)
A construction of f is a finite sequence g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g ν where g 1 is 0, g 2 is S, f is in the sequence, and each g µ for 3 ≤ µ ≤ ν is constructed by primitive recursion from terms containing no function symbols other than those strictly preceding it in the sequence. The PR function symbols are those that have a construction. A PR term is a term in which every function symbol is PR, and a PR number is a variable-free PR term.
PRA is formulated as a formal system as follows. Its nonlogical symbols are the PR function symbols. Its nonlogical axioms are the construction axioms A1 and A2 for definitions of PR function symbols, and the successor axioms
The logical axioms are reflexivity
and the propositional axioms
There are three rules of inference:
instance: from A infer an instance of A modus ponens: from A and A → B infer B induction: from A x (0) and
As in any formal system, a proof is a finite sequence of formulas each of which is either an axiom or follows from strictly preceding formulas by a rule of inference, and it is a proof of A in case A is in the sequence. Decorated π stands for a finite sequence of formulas. The notation π ⊢ A means that π is a proof in PRA of A, while ⊢ A means that there is a proof π in PRA of A, in which case A is a theorem of PRA.
The Propositions in this paper are metamathematical in nature; they are statements about PRA whose proofs are finitary in the strict sense of being expressible in PRA. Proof. For (i), refer to [HA] . Hilbert and Ackermann give a finitary proof that in the formal system whose only axioms are 8-11 and whose only rule of inference is modus ponens, the theorems are precisely the tautologies.
For (ii), suppose that ⊢ A 1 , . . . , ⊢ A ν and that A 1 → · · · → A ν → A is a tautology, and hence a theorem by (i). Then we have ⊢ A 2 → · · · → A ν → A by modus ponens. Proceeding in this way we obtain a proof of A in ν steps. In other words, tautological consequence is a derived rule of inference in PRA.
For (iii), just insert the proofs of the cited theorems. Given a deduction as in (iv), replace H, B 1 , . . . , B ν by H → H, H → B 1 , . . . , H → B ν . Then H → H is a theorem by (i). If B µ is a theorem then H → B µ is a tautological consequence of it. If B µ is a tautological consequence of strictly preceding formulas, then H → B µ is a tautological consequence of them with the B λ , for 1 ≤ λ < µ, among them replaced by H → B λ . In this way, by (ii), we have a proof of H → B ν , proving (iv). (Notice that no instance of H is taken. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the variables in H are held constant.)
Given a claim as in (v), proceed as in (iv). Any formula, in particular A, is a tautological consequence of B ν and ¬B ν , so adjoin A to the deduction. Discharging the hypothesis ¬A we obtain ¬A → A, of which A is a tautological consequence, proving (v). (A special case of this is an indirect proof, in which the theorem itself is the claim.)
The only predicate symbol in PRA is =. Nevertheless, we can introduce other predicate symbols as abbreviations. Given A, let x be its distinct variables in some order, set p( x) ↔ A, and let p( a) abbreviate the instance A x ( a). Use decorated p q to stand for predicate symbols other than =; they occur only in abbreviations. An explicit definition of f is f( x) = c where no variable other than those in x occurs in c. Then let f( a) abbreviate c x ( a). Explicitly defined function symbols occur only in abbreviations.
Some formulas are marked ⋆ or ⋆⋆ for emphasis.
Equality
#2. Construct Eq so that ⊢ Eq(x, y) = 0 ↔ x = y.
Hilbert and Bernays construct such a function symbol in §7 of the first edition of [HB] (1939) . Following a suggestion of Kreisel to establish the basic properties of < without using addition, Bernays omitted this explicit construction in the second edition (1968) . We give the surprisingly long construction of Eq from the first edition. (Their unary δ is our P, their binary δ is our −, and their δ(a, b) + δ(b, a) is our Eq(a, b).)
Primitive recursions are labeled with r, theorems with t, explicit definitions with e, and definitions of PR predicate symbols with d; if one of these letters is capitalized, it indicates a schema. If ξ labels a theorem A, and x 1 , . . . , x ν are the first ν distinct variables of A in the order of first occurrence, then ξ;a 1 ; . . . ;a ν is the theorem A x 1 ,...,x ν (a 1 , . . . , a ν ). 
Proof. H:x:y 21;x 27;y;x 28;x;y The ? indicates the introduction of a claim.
#3
. Using the case function symbol C such that C(x, y, z) is y if x is 0 and is z otherwise, form the characteristic term χA so that ⊢ χA = 0 ↔ A. Construct the formal system χPRA, equivalent to PRA, whose only symbols are variables and PR function symbols: the logical connectives and = are eliminated. But continue working in PRA. To each A associate a term χA, the characteristic term of A, recursively as follows.
That is, χA is obtained by replacing each = by=, each ¬ by¬, and each ∨ by∨ . From this it follows that (4) [χA]
If ℓ is a decorated roman letter occurring in an expression schema v, then v, ℓ/u is the expression or expression schema obtained by replacing each occurrence of ℓ in v by u. Now reformulate PRA as a formal system χPRA with a simpler data structure. The symbols of χPRA are the variables and the PR function symbols. Terms are as before. A χ-equation is a term of the form a= b. The formulas of χPRA, called χ-formulas, are defined recursively as follows. A χ-equation is a χ-formula; if b and c are χ-formulas, so are¬b and b∨ c. Decorated α β γ δ stand for χ-formulas. Note that χ is bijective from formulas of PRA onto formulas of χPRA; each α is χA for a unique A, χ −1 α. Think of the χ-formula α as asserting that the term α is equal to 0. The axioms of χPRA are the characteristic terms of the axioms of PRA; the rules of inference of χPRA are formed from the rules of inference of PRA by replacing each premise and conclusion by its characteristic term.
Explicitly, the axioms and rules of inference of χPRA are as follows, where in Aχ1 and Aχ2, f is the function symbol defined by A1 and A2.
Aχ1. f( x, y)= a Aχ2. f( x, Sy)= b z f( x, y) aχ3.¬ Sx= 0 aχ4. Sx= Sy→ x= y aχ5. x= x aχ6. x= y→ y= x Aχ7. x= y& α x (x)→ α x (y) Aχ8. α∨ α→ α Aχ9. α→ α∨ β Aχ10. α∨ β→ β∨ α Aχ11. (β→ γ)→ (α∨ β→ α∨ γ) χ-instance: from α infer an instance of α χ-modus ponens: from α and α→ β infer β χ-induction: from α x (0) and
A proof in χPRA is a χ-proof. Decorated σ stands for a finite sequence of χ-formulas, σ ⊢ χ α asserts that σ is a χ-proof of α, and ⊢ χ α asserts that α is a theorem of χPRA.
PROPOSITION 3.
The following are equivalent: ⊢ A and ⊢ χA = 0 and ⊢ χ χA.
Proof. The first two are equivalent by T51. Let π ⊢ A. Then χ • π ⊢ χ χA-for if B in π is an axiom, so is χB, and if B is inferred by a rule of inference, then χB is inferred by the corresponding rule. Conversely, if σ ⊢ χ χA, let π consist of all B of the form χ −1 β = 0 for β in σ. If β is an axiom, then χ −1 β is an axiom D of PRA, so B is χD = 0, which is a theorem by T51, A/D. If β is inferred by a rule of inference, then B is inferred by the corresponding rule. Hence π is a proof with citation of theorems from the theorem schema T51, so ⊢ A.
#4. Establish primitive recursion by cases, though it will not be used until much later.
The following Proposition expresses the familiar "if, else if, . . . , else if, else" pattern for cases. 
Bounded quantifiers

#5. Given a formula A and a variable x, construct the PR function symbol µ A so that µ A (x) (with the other variables in A not indicated in the notation) finds the first
Introduce the PR predicate symbols ≤ (less than) and < (strictly less than).
Proof. H:x 55 
Proof. H:x:y:z 12;y;z 12;x;y+z 12;x+y;z 4;x+(y+z);(x+y)+z Let y be the distinct variables of A other than x in the order of first occurrence, and let µ A (a) abbreviate µ A ( y, a). Define the PR function symbol µ A by
Remark that if x 1 is any variable other than those in y and A 1 is A x (x 1 ), then µ A 1 is the same as µ A . We have µ A (x) = Sx until an x ′ (if any) is found such that A x (x ′ ) holds, after which it remains x ′ forever, as we now demonstrate (with implicit uses of equality axioms and symmetry). .7 ¬A x (0) QEA by .6 and .7.
, Sx, SSx)) By .6 and 33;µ A (x), .7 µ A (Sx) = µ A (x) By .1 and .4,
By .7 and .8,
The claim is proved by .3 and .9, and .4-.9 will not be used again.
.10 ¬ µ A (x) ≤ x By .10 and 53, A/µ A (x) ≤ x, .11 χ[µ A (x) ≤ x] = S0 By .11 and 82, .12 
Proof. Suppose not. Then (the induction hypothesis is not needed in this proof)
, Sx, SSx) By .3 and .7, .8 µ A (Sx) = C(0, Sx, SSx) By .8 and 33;Sx;SSx, .9 µ A (Sx) = Sx By .9 and 60;Sx, .10 µ A (Sx) ≤ Sx The claim is proved by .2 and .10, and .4-.10 will not be used again.
.11 µ A (x) ≤ x By .11 and 51, A/µ A (x) ≤ x, .12 χ[µ A (x) ≤ x] = 0 By .12 and 82,
. 
Proof. By 84 and 83.
Proof. By 12;x and 5;µ A (x).
By .2 and .1, .4 µ A (x + w) = µ A (x) By 12;x;w, .5 x + Sw = S(x + w) By .4 and .2, .6 µ A (x + w) ≤ x By .6 and 71;x;w and 73;µ A (x + w);x;x + w, .7 µ A (x + w) ≤ x + w By .7 and 51, A/µ A (x + w) ≤ x + w, .8 χ[µ A (x + w) ≤ x + w] = 0 By .8 and 82;x + w,
By .9 and .5 and 33;µ A (x + w);C(χ[A x (S(x + w))], S(x + w), SS(x + w)),
.10 µ A (x + Sw) = µ A (x + w) By .10 and .4, .11 µ A (x + Sw) = µ A (x) QEA by .3 and .11.
By .2 and 68;x;z, .4 z = x + (z − x) By .1 and .4 and 86;x;z − x, .5 µ A (z) = µ A (x) QEA by .3 and .5. If x does occur in b, let ∃x≤b A abbreviate A x (µ A (b)), and let ∀x≤b A abbreviate A x (µ ¬A (b)). Then ∀x≤b A is tautologically equivalent to ¬∃x≤b ¬A, since the latter is the double negation of the former. Call ∃x≤b and ∀x ≤ b bounded quantifiers; they occur only in abbreviations, and x does not occur in ∃x≤b A or ∀x≤b A. Each is an instance of A.
#6. Introduce bounded quantifiers ∃x≤b
By .2 and 85, For the converse we have a specific number, µ A (b), that is less than b and satisfies A.
Proof. Tautologically equivalent to 88, A/¬A.
By 89, b/c, 
.6 PSx = x By .6 and .3,
.8 x ≤ x By .8 and .7 and 90,
.10 Px ≤ x By .10 and .7 and 90, 
Now simplify PRA even further, via formal theories PRA* and χPRA*. The symbols, terms, and formulas of PRA* are those of PRA; its axioms are all instances of axioms of PRA and of T93; its only rule of inference is modus ponens. The symbols, terms, and formulas of χPRA* are those of χPRA; its axioms are the characteristic terms of the axioms of PRA*; its only rule of inference is χ-modus ponens. Proofs and theorems of these two systems are indicated by ⊢ * and ⊢ χ * . Proof. For (i), let π ⊢ A and let B x (x) be the first formula in π that is inferred by induction, from B x (0) and B x (x ′ ) → B x (Sx ′ ). Then we have proofs of these two premises without using induction. By an instance of the second premise we have ∀x≤Px[
] by tautological consequence. By 93, A/B we have B x (x). Proceeding in this way, by metamathematical induction on the number of inferences by induction in π, we have a proof π 1 of A from the axioms of PRA* without using induction. Now consider the first formula C x ( a) of π 1 that is inferred by instance, from C. Let π 2 the the part of π 1 strictly preceding C x ( a). Let D ′ be D x ( a), and let π 
(Don't delete π 2 , because later formulas in π 1 may be inferred by instance from a formula in it.) Proceeding in this way. by metamathematical induction on the number of inferences by instance in π 1 , we obtain a proof of A in PRA*. The converse direction of (i) is trivial, since the axioms of PRA* are theorems of PRA and the rule of inference of PRA* is a rule of inference of PRA.
For ( and D
π is an axiom, so is χB, and if B is inferred by modus ponens, then χB is inferred by χ-modus ponens. Conversely, if σ ⊢ χ * χA, let π consist of all B of the form χ −1 β = 0 for β in σ. If β is an axiom, then χ −1 β is an axiom D of PRA*, which is a theorem of PRA, so B is χD = 0, which is a theorem of PRA by T51, A/D. If β is inferred by χ-modus ponens, then B is inferred by modus ponens. Hence π is a proof in PRA with citation of theorems, so ⊢ A. Consequently, ⊢ * A by (i). For (iv), let χA be a variable-free theorem of χ-PRA. By (iii), A is a variable-free theorem of PRA*, which by (ii) has a variable-free proof π in PRA*. As shown in the proof of (iii), χ • π ⊢ χ * χA, and this proof is variable-free.
#8. Construct the least number principle as a derived rule of inference.
If the recursion for µ A finds an x ′ such that A x (x ′ ) holds, then x ′ is the least number for which A x (x ′ ) holds. This leads to the least number principle, a powerful form of induction. 
By .3 and 84;µ A (x),
By .2 and .5 and 56
By .3 and .6 and 94;µ A (x);µ A (µ A (x)), .7 ¬A x (µ A (µ A (x))) QEA by .4 and .7. Such function symbols are defined function symbols; they occur only in abbreviations.
PROPOSITION 6. If A does not have a least counterexample, then A holds. That is, if
⊢ ¬{¬A x (z) & ∀y<z[A x (y)]} then ⊢ A x (x). Proof. Suppose .0 ⊢ ¬{¬A x (z) & ∀y<z[A x (y)]}.
#9. Construct definition of function symbols with uniqueness condition and bounded existence condition.
PROPOSITION 7. Let A contain no variables other than the distinct variables y and x. The uniqueness condition (UC) is
A x (x) & A x (x ′ ) → x = x ′ ,
Strings
A string is a concatenation of bits. Identify the number x with the string consisting of the ones and zeros following the initial one in the binary representation of Sx. We implement this in PRA.
#10. Prove that every non-zero number Sx can be written uniquely as Qx + Rx where
Qx is a power of two and Rx is strictly less than Qx. 
Proof. H:x:y:z 12;y;z 100;x;z 100;x;y+z 72;x·y;x·z;x t101.
Proof. H:x:y 100;y 100;x 100;x·y r126.
Proof. H 116 115 126;2 125;0
Proof. H:x 126;2;x 124;x;2↑x
Proof. H:x 127;x 56
Although "is a power of two" contains English words, it is a formal predicate symbol, written in suffix notation. The negation of "q is a power of two" is "¬ q is a power of two", whereas "q is not a power of two" is not even an expression. In general, ∃x≤b A obeys the expected rule: we can choose any y not previously used in the proof, hold it fixed, indicated by :y, and obtain y ≤ b & A x (y). t135. q is a power of two → 2 · q is a power of two t136i.
t130. 1 is a power of two
Proof. H:x:y:z 12;y;z 126;x;y+z 126;x;z 102;x;x↑y;x↑z 102;x↑y;x;x↑z 105;x;x↑y 
Proof. H:x:z:y 108;x;y 106;x;y−x;z 132;y−x;z 12;x·z 120;x·z;0;(y−x)·z
Proof. H;x;z;y 141a;x;z;y 141a;y;z;x 77;x;y t142. e172. x ⊕ y = P(Sx · Qy + Ry) ⋆ Why is ⊕ called concatenation? As an example, consider the string 101 (i.e., the number x such that Sx in binary is 1101) and the string 01 (i.e., the number y such that Sy in binary is 101). In binary, Qy is 100, Ry is 1, and Sx · Qy + Ry is 110101, so x ⊕ y is the string 10101 (i.e., the number whose successor in binary is 110101).
String arithmetic is analogous to number arithmetic, with one zero, ǫ, but with two successors: x → x ⊕ 0 and x → x ⊕ 1. Concatenation is the string analogue of addition. We have founded string arithmetic on number arithmetic, but we need to develop it to the point that it becomes independent of this foundation.
Proof. H:x:y:z 22;x 104;Px;z 98;Px·z;z 71;z;Px·z 144;y;z;x·z t174. x < y → z + x < z + y Proof. H:x:y:z 98;z;x 98;z;y 170;x;y;z t179. S(x ⊕ y) = Sx · Qy + Ry 
Proof. We have f( x, ǫ) = a by 185. By Proposition 4 of §4, Note that (10), the "else" clause, is irrelevant, since its hypothesis cannot hold, by 253;Sy together with 3;y and 185. Now consider (8);P(w ⊕ 0):
We have w ⊕ 0 = 0 (by 185 and 204;w;0 and 188), so SP(w ⊕ 0) = w ⊕ 0 by 22;w ⊕ 0. Also, Chop(w ⊕ 0) = w by 243;w. Therefore
and so f( x, w ⊕ 0) = b z (w). The derivation of f( x, w ⊕ 1) = c z (w) from (11);SP(w ⊕ 1) is entirely similar. Hence (7).
A string recursion is a primitive recursion of the form (6), but string recursions will be introduced simply by (7). 
Proof. Suppose that
and use the least number principle (Proposition 6 of §5). Suppose that there is a least counterexample z to A:
We have z = ǫ by (12). Then, by 253;z, The first alternative of (16) does not hold, by (13);Chop z, and the second does not hold, by (14);Chop z. Hence A x (x) by the least number principle.
The derived rule of inference, from A x (ǫ) and
#14. Construct Length by string recursion, and introduce (shorter than) and ≺ (strictly shorter than). Prove x y → x ≤ 2 · Qx and x ≺ y → x < y. The first will enable bounded quantifiers with bounding symbol rather than ≤, and the second will enable the use of the least number principle for strings ("the shortest string principle"). Express the i'th bit of a string. 
Since Length x < Length y, we have Qx < Qy by t261 and t145. If ¬ x < y, then y ≤ x, so Qy ≤ Qx by t272, a contradiction. It is essential to have the strict bound y itself on ≺ to apply the least number principle to strings. t000b.
Proof. H:x 1 :y:x 2 183;x 1 ;y;0 183;x 2 ;y;0 243;x 1 ⊕y 243;x 2 ⊕y t000j. [
Proof. H:x 1 :y:x 2 183;x 1 ;y;1 183;x 2 ;y;1 244;x 1 ⊕y 244;x 2 ⊕y t000. t005.
Proof. .9 x ⊕ 0 = a 2 The claim is proved by .2 and .5 and .9, and .8-.9 will not be used again.
. Neither of these papers have been circulated before in their current forms. An earlier version of Elements was circulated in 2011, but was found to have problems in its treatment of proofs generated by Chaitin machines. The new 2013 version uses a similar approach, but gives a much more detailed explanation of the planned proof, and it handles Chaitin machines differently so as to address the earlier problems.
Nelson's remarkable program to establish the inconsistency of Peano arithmetic was intertwined with his development of Internal Set Theory [4] and especially Predicative Arithmetic [5] . Predicative Arithmetic is a constructive fragment of arithmetic, and Nelson's development of Predicative Arithmetic was inspired in part by Yessenin-Volpin's ultra-intuitionistic set theory [6] . The mathematical content of Predicate Arithmetic is closely tied to theories of bounded arithmetic such as I∆ 0 , I∆ 0 + Ω 1 , S i 2 and T i 2 . Indeed, Nelson [5] independently discovered some of the important tools for bounded arithmetic, including the technique of speeding up induction on cuts and the local interpretability of predicative arithmetic and bounded arithmetic in Robinson's theory Q. Nelson's Predicative Arithmetic was also influential for the definition by one of us (Buss) The Elements manuscript gives a detailed, high-level outline of Nelson's plan for a proof of the inconsistency of Peano arithmetic (and primitive recursive arithmetic). One of the principal tools is a novel use of a recent proof by Kritchman and Raz [3] of Godel's second incompleteness theorem based on the "surprise examination". Nelson also uses Kolmogorov complexity and techniques from cut-elimination. The detailed plan of the inconsistency proof is outlined as Steps 1-17 in section 9 near the end of Elements. The plan first discusses a system S * which is a predicative theory including bounded induction and which is strong enough to express concepts about metamathetical concepts, Chaitin machine computation, and Kolmogorov complexity.
Step 7 introduces a finitary theory F ; the details of the system F are not fully specified, but it needs to be able to formalize cut-elimination or normalization. Thus it seems that F can be taken to be, for instance, I∆ 0 + superexp or IΣ 1 . The heart of the argument is reached in Step 16. Unfortunately, the argument becomes very uncertain here. Nelson argues that S * disproves a sequence of statements:
first A κ,0 , then A κ,1 , etc., up through A κ,I . The base case that S * disproves A κ,0 is fine, but the later stages are unclear. It seems that the disproof of A κ,δ requires an assumption that S * is consistent. The reason for this is that the Chaitin machine cannot be given the value of δ as an input since the Kolmogorov complexity of δ may not be sufficiently below that of κ. The only alternative to explicitly specifying δ that we can think of, is for the Chaitin machine to first search for the S * proof that "¬A κ,δ+1 " and then also wait until δ many strings are found to have Chaitin complexity less than κ. This however assumes that S * is consistent. Of course, S * does not prove its own consistency. Perhaps Nelson had a different argument in mind, but this is our best attempt to flesh out his arguments. At any rate, Nelson was apparently aware of the potential problem here, since he earlier discusses the need for a system to prove the "consistency of its own arithmetization". In the spirit of a quote by Carl Sagan, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", Nelson planned to fulfill his inconsistency proof by exhibiting a fully formal, computer-verified derivation of a contradiction. That is, he planned not to prove that there is a proof of contradiction, but to actually exhibit an explicit proof of a contradiction. The first steps of this are carried out at the end of Elements, and it is even further pursued in Balrog. The Balrog manuscript is still incomplete, as only six sections are complete, and at least ten sections were planned. The Balrog manuscript is in essence a formalization of the "bootstrapping" of predicative arithmetic in the spirit of [5] . A remarkable feature of Balrog is that proofs of theorems are indicated in a terse fashion that permits a Perl program, called qea, to automatically verify the proofs. These indicate that 13b. is proved by substituting 0+0 for x in axiom a5., and that 13i. is proved by using definition r12. three times, first substituting Sx for x, then 0 and x for x and y, and finally x for x. After these substitutions, the desired conclusions follow propositionally from equality axioms. The qea system then automatically generated an expanded proof; the expanded proof was produced as a TeX file, and automatically converted to PDF. An example is shown in an appendix to the Balrog manuscript posted to the arXiv.
We of course believe that Peano arithmetic is consistent; thus we do not expect that Nelson's project can be completed according to his plans. Nonetheless, there is much new in his papers that is of potential mathematical, philosophical and computational interest. For this reason, they are being posted to the arXiv. Two aspects of these papers seem particularly useful. The first aspect is the novel use of the "surprise examination" and Kolmogorov complexity; there is some possibility that similar techniques might lead to new separation results for fragments of arithmetic. The second aspect is Nelson's automatic proof-checking via TeX and qea. This is highly interesting and provides a novel method of integrating human-readable proofs with computer verification of proofs.
The reader interested in further discussion of Nelson's Predicative Arithmetic can consult the mostly-survey article [1] . The volume [2] contains papers about many other aspects of Nelson's wide-ranging research. Other works by Nelson are available at math.princeton.edu/∼nelson, including a number of philosophical works.
